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Although power is a major concern of organization theory, little research has focused
on the horizontal dimension of power between organizations at relatively equal
hierarchical levels. This study attempts to fill that void by operationalizing organi-
zational power for 127 federal government agencies. The derived measure is subjected
to tests for internal and external validity by empirically testing one promising theory
of agency power.
Since the writings of Max Weber, power has been a con-
cept of central concern to students of bureaucracy (March,
1955; Thompson, 1967; Kahn and Boulding, 1964; Scott and
Mitchell, 1972; Rourke, 1976; McNeill, 1978). Political scien-
tists also regard power, both interorganizational and inter-
personal, as a central concept in political analysis (Dahl, 1957,
1968; Shapely and Shubik, 1954; Simon, 1957; Riker, 1959,
1964; Parsons, 1966). Despite the attention devoted to this
concept by a variety of scholars, the literature on power has
two serious voids. First, the major theories (Hickson et al.,
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1971; Blau, 1964) and research (Cotton, 1976) have focused on
interpersonal power (usually within a single organization).
Without reifying the organization, one can argue that power
is a useful concept to describe the relationship between organi-
zations. Lockheed Aircraft, for example, is dependent on the
Defense Department as the sole market for many of its
products. Clearly a power relationship exists between these
two organizations. Second, the literature’s focus has been
on the vertical dimension of power (e.g., Tannenbaum, 1968),
to the neglect of the horizontal dimension (Landsberger, 1961).
Vertical power concerns the relationship between individuals
at different levels of hierarchy, while horizontal power con-
cerns power relationships between individuals or between
organizations at the same level of hierarchy.
This paper will address the horizontal dimension of organi-
zational power through a study of 127 government organi-
zations. First, it offers a definition of power relevant to
government agencies, yet consistent with some past research
on interpersonal power. Second, &dquo;agency power&dquo; will be
operationalized for these agencies, focusing on the measure’s
internal and external validity. Third, as a portion of the
external validity argument, the measure of agency power
will be used as a dependent variable to test Rourke’s (1976)
theory of bureaucratic power. This test will illustrate the
empirical import of the developed measure.
POWER AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES
That government bureaus exercise power (in political or
sociological terms) is accepted by most students of government
organizations (Warwick, 1975; Rourke, 1976). In political
terms, power may be defined as the ability to make decisions
that affect the distribution of societal values (Easton, 1965;
Lowi, 1969). Government bureaus, by participating in the
policy making process, regulate corporate behavior, interpret
tax laws and other vague statutes, operate massive transfer
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payment programs, stimulate and guide most scientific re-
search, and provide options for national defense, among other
functions (Kohlmeier, 1969; Woll, 1977;. Redford, 1969;
Steiner, 1966; Lambright, 1976; Allison, 1971). By imple-
menting policy, by proposing new policy alternatives, by
clarifying the legislative intent of policy, and by enforcing
policy established elsewhere, government bureaus authori-
tatively allocate scarce societal values (Easton, 1965)-and
that is power.
Within the sociological definition of power, government
agency activities also create dependence relationships for
others. We need only note the vast government regulation of
individual and corporate behavior as an example of the de-
pendence relationships between government bureaucracies
and ourselves as citizens. The Internal Revenue Service, by
its decision to audit or not audit tax returns, makes us de-
pendent on it. The Interstate Commerce Commission deter-
mines the price we must pay for nonair transportation. The
list of individual dependencies on government bureaus is
endless.
Given the exercise of power by government bureaus, can
this phenomenon be measured? Many scholars have grappled
with the concept (Dahl, 1957, 1968; Simon, 1957; Riker, 1959,
1964; Parsons, 1966; March, 1955) and have failed to reach a
consensus on either the meaning of power or the concept’s
utility. Despite the lack of consensus, the voluminous research
on power provides some insights useful in developing a mea-
sure of agency power. According to Robert Dahl (1957: 203)
power is a relational concept, meaningful only in comparative
references. To rank actors or agencies, therefore, on the basis
of power requires that each agency interact with the same
set of individuals in relatively similar activities so that their
actions can be compared.
Power must be understood not only as a relational concept
but one with two necessary components. For any organization,
including government organizations, to exercise power, it
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must have two things: resources and discretion in the use of
those resources. The sine qua non of bureaucratic power is
access to resources-money, personnel, legislative authority,
and other tools necessary to make and implement decisions.
Without such resources, an organization ceases to exist (Katz
and Kahn, 1966). One agency, therefore, is more powerful than
another if it can extract more resources form its environment.
The resources component of power relates directly to
dependence on other institutions. Only Congress and the
President can grant these agencies their needed resources.
Because every agency is more or less dependent on these same
actors for resources (comparability), the relative ability of
one bureau to extract resources and, thus, lessen its depen-
dency, can be compared to the ability of other bureaus.
Access to resources or rather the ability to extract resources
is not sufficient to create power for a bureau. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Social Security Adminis-
tration (SSA) are both successful in extracting resources from
their environments, but the SSA’s power is a mere shadow of
that exercised by the NIH. The difference is discretion. The
NIH is relatively free in its policy spheres of influence to
decide priorities and pursue its own defined goals; the SSA,
on the other hand, is rigidly bound by rules and legislation
passed by a Congress intent on restricting the scope of its
discretion (Steiner, 1966; Schick, 1971). Discretion, therefore,
is in part the agency’s dependence on other organizations.
Resource extraction and discretion in the use of resources
after extraction are two separate dimensions of agency power.
An agency can have an abundance of resources with little
discretion, as the Social Security Administration does, or
have few resources, but a great deal of discretion, as the
Internal Revenue Service does. A lucky agency may have both,
as in the case of the NIH, or be so unfortunate, as was the
Selective Service Commission in the mid-1970s, to have
neither. This research is concerned with tapping the variation
in power possessed by government agencies to determine
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which agencies can operate as relatively free from restrictions
of law or supervision and also have significant societal re-
sources at their disposal.
THE AGENCIES
The population for this study of organizational power is
all operating agencies of the federal government that were in
existence from 1970 through 1975 and employed at least 200
people. These criteria exclude coordinating organizations,
temporary organizations, and agencies too small to be of
major concern to either the Congress or the President. A total
of 127 agencies were included in this study.
MEASUREMENT: THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Measuring any variable as complex as power (of resources
and autonomy) requires the development of measures that are
both valid and reliable. A measure is reliable if a given property
is measured for a given individual several times with similar
results (Crano and Brewer, 1973; Blalock, 1968). Too often,
however, in pursuit of reliable measures, the question of
validity is ignored. Validity has two aspects: internal validity
and external validity (Crano and Brewer, 1973; Campbell and
Fiske, 1959). Internal validity, simply stated, is whether or
not the variable measures what it is supposed to measure.
External validity means that the measure is empirically corre-
lated to other measures that are linked to it by theory. To
create reliable and valid measures of resources and autonomy,
this study will use one measurement technique to create the
measures and another to assess the measures’ validity.
To operationalize resources and autonomy, one must
assume that some theoretical-level concept equivalent to each
variable exists. Because directly measuring such concepts as
resource extraction and discretion is impossible, a series of
operational indicators must be logically related to the under-
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lying concept. Each indicator taps some portion of the concept,
but none of the indicators is a perfect measure (Torgerson,
1958). The indicators will then be combined to cancel out the
measurement errors.
RESOURCES
Because any volume of resources that does not grow will
eventually become a constraint, our six indicators of resource
attraction focus on growth rather than size. &dquo;Congressional
budget growth&dquo; is the percentage rate that Congress permits
the agency’s budget to grow from year to year (this study uses
1970-1976). This single measure is a good representation of
overall budget growth, as it is strongly related to avoiding
budget cuts and garnering presidential support. Neither the
presidential growth rate nor the congressional cut rate add
much additional information.
Growth in dollars amounts, however, is often meaningless
to a bureau without a corresponding &dquo;growth in personnel.&dquo;
To build a powerful organization and expand program con-
tent, bureaus need additional personnel as well as funds. An
indicator of the growth in perquisites is agency &dquo;growth in
supergrade positions.&dquo; By adding additional positions at the
GS 16-18 level, promotion opportunities expand for the per-
sonnel in the bureau, permitting it to attract quality personnel
and to retain administrators who might otherwise leave.
&dquo;Growth in the number of executive positions&dquo; taps the same
dimension as supergrade growth but at a higher level.
&dquo;Supplemental appropriations&dquo; are special requests to Con-
gress for funds to cover deficiencies, noew programs, and un-
expected expenses. A bureau confident of supplemental appro-
priations can act positively and know that its actions will
be sanctioned at a later date. As an indicator, the total num-
ber of supplemental appropriations granted from 1974 to
1976 was used. The final indicator of resources is &dquo;new legis-
lation.&dquo; Agencies that are granted their requests for new
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legislation are able to expand their sphere of influence. The
indicator is a measure of the number of new pieces of legis-
lation that the agency requested and received.
AUTONOMY
Autonomy is more difficult to measure; therefore, the
indicators of autonomy will be more controversial than those
for resources (see Price, 1972 for an attempted catalog). One
indicator of autonomy is an agency’s dependence on the
appropriations process; independence in this instance means
that the budget is not affected by major changes in the political
environment (Bozeman, 1977). One way to independence is
through &dquo;permanent authorizations.&dquo; These allow agencies to
spend money over long periods of time rather than over the
traditional one or two years. Permanent authorizations free
the agency from the annual authorization process and, there-
fore, from dependence on Congress’ substantive committees.
The variable used as an indicator of autonomy is the per-
centage of the agency budget that is protected by permanent
authorizations.
A second facet of autonomy is budgetary discretion. The
first indicator of budgetary discretion is the degree that
Congress requires detail in an agency’s budget. An agency such
as the Army Corps of Engineers must include in its budget sub-
mission every program and project that the agency adminis-
ters, while other agencies’ budgets are devoid of detail. &dquo;Budget
detail&dquo; is the ratio of the agency’s budget size in dollars to
the number of pages the budget takes in the Budget Appendix.
A second measure of budgetary discretion is the extent of
agency &dquo;reprogramming.&dquo; This means nothing more than
transferring funds from one program to another. Although the
extent of reprogramming is difficult to discern, one can
measure the tip of the iceberg by comparing program by
program budget estimates with the actual expenditures a year
later. This measure of reprogramming will miss within cate-
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gory shifts and, therefore, underestimate the extent of re-
programming by an agency, but it is currently the only repro-
gramming measure available.
The final indicators of bureau autonomy are &dquo;rulemaking&dquo;
and the &dquo;rules to laws ratio.&dquo; Because most legislation is
vague, agencies must issue rules and regulations to clarify
the intent of Congress and to establish public policy guide-
lines. Two crude measures of legislative autonomy are the
number of rules the agency has issued and the ratio of the
number of pages of rules the bureau issues to the number of
pages of substantive legislation that applies to the agency.
None of the indicators of resources or autonomy perfectly
measures these variables. For this reason several indicators
of each are used. Each indicator captures only a portion of
the concept; the remaining portion of the indicator is error.
To measure resources and autonomy, a technique is required
that captures what the indicators have in common. (Measure-
ment theory assumes that the common element represents the
underlying variable.) The appropriate technique for extracting
this commonality is factor analysis (Heise, 1975; Levine, 1977);
therefore, using classical factor analysis, two indexes repre-
senting the ability to extract resources2 (resources for short)
and autonomy3 were created.
Because the concepts of resource extraction and autonomy
do not have a long history of use and the indicators used here
are at best imperfect, the internal validity of the measures
should be analyzed (the nature of the measures insures accept-
able reliability). To assess validity, another measure of each
independent variable is needed-preferably a measure con-
structed by a totally different method. One possible procedure
for constructing such a measure is the elite opinion method,
whereby individuals with a great deal of knowledge about the
agencies rank them on the dimensions of resource extraction
and autonomy. Because experts able to rank all 127 federal
agencies do not exist, a subset of agencies (20 bureaus within
the Department of Agriculture) was used in this test.
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The survey panel was composed of 29 persons with expertise
in agricultural policy but who were not employees of the
Department of Agriculture. The panel included 19 academics
from several disciplines who have written in the area, 4 promi-
nent interest-group representatives of the leading general farm
organizations, and 6 congressional staff members serving the
4 committees most concerned with agricultural policy. Of
these, 22 returned surveys-15 academics, 5 staff members,
and 2 elite interest group members. Each individual rated the
20 bureaus in the Department of Agriculture on the dimen-
sions of resources and autonomy.
The experts’ perceptions were averaged and compared to
the agency scores developed by the factor index method. For
resource extraction the two measures are positively correlated
at 
.53-good but not exceptional validity. For autonomy the
measures are positively but weakly correlated (f = .17), a not
unexpected result given the problems of this concept.
Although the tests for internal validity do not show strong
results, reasons other than inadequate internal validity might
be the cause. First, the elite opinion measure is flawed. The
expert panel was rather hesitant to rank agencies, pleading
lack of sufficient knowledge about all 20 agencies. The prob-
lem, as a result, might be with the elite opinion measure
rather than the factor index. Second, because this is an ex-
ploratory effort and the internal validity coefficients are
positive, a full examination of the measure requires us to
proceed with the analysis of external validity.
To do so, an index of agency power must be created, as this
paper is concerned with bureaucratic power rather than an
agency’s ability to extract resources and its autonomy in the
use of those resources. An agency has power if it has both
resources and autonomy; having one without the other is
rarely beneficial for the agency. This theoretical relationship
suggests that power is a product of the bureau’s resources and
its autonomy in the use of those resources. The bureaucratic
power measure used in the remainder of this paper, therefore,
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will be the product of the resources and the autonomy mea-
sure.4
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Francis Rourke ( 1976) presents a theoretical argument
that bureau power, as defined here, is a function of the bureau’s
clientele support, its expertise, its leadership, and its cohesion.
To measure these variables, the same approach as used
above-creating a series of indicators for an underlying con-
cept-will be used. These indicators will be combined via
factor analysis to create measures of the variables. Because
these concepts are of substantive interest to students of organi-
zational power, the indicators will be discussed in detail.
Clientele. A good set of indicators for clientele support
would cover the spectrum from diffuse public support (e.g.,
public opinion) to specific interest-group support. As an
indicator of diffuse public support, the percentage of the popu-
lation supporting increased governmental expenditures for
an agency’s functional areas was used.5 For a series of more
specific clientele measures, the House Appropriations Com-
mittee hearings for fiscal years 1974-76 were content analyzed.
The variables gathered for each bureau include the number of
groups testifying for the bureau, the number of congressmen
testifying for the bureau, the intensity of the group support,6
the intensity of congressional supporters, and the percentage
of support from mass associations, peak associations, and
single petitioners.
An additional indicator of clientele intensity was created
by calculating the ratio of groups that appear to testify per-
sonally to those that sent written testimony under the assump-
tion that personal appearances indicate greater commitment
because greater effort is required. As an indicator of clientele
dispersion, the percentage of agency personnel stationed out-
side the Washington metropolitan area was used; we assumed
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that personnel distributions roughly reflect clientele distri-
butions. The final clientele indicator was a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the agency had the ability to con-
tract for services or products. As the Defense Department has
convincingly demonstrated, contracting is a good way to
attract agency clientele. The 11 indicators of clientele support
were combined into a single index of clientele support.’ 7
Expertise. The expertise measure is a function of six indi-
cators. The first indicator, the number of personnel employed,
illustrates a bureau’s potential for specialization. The larger
a bureau is, the more it can specialize its employees by breaking
tasks into smaller components (Weber, 1946). Two indicators
of technological capacity were also used in the measure-
first, whether or not the agency had in-house research capa-
bilities and second, the number of computers used by the
agency. Finally, three indirect measures of professionalism
were used. Because professionals are among the higher paid
members of any bureaucracy, the number of professionals in
a given agency should be positively correlated with the average
GS rating for the agency and the percentage of agency per-
sonnel who hold higher civil service ratings (GS 14+). In
addition to these two indirect measures of professionalism,
the final measure of professionalization is whether or not
the bureau chief is a scientist in the agency’s area of activity.
The six indicators of expertise were combined to create a
single measure of expertise.8
Leadership. Indicators of leadership rely solely on varia-
tions in the bureau chief s career patterns. Careers were
content-analyzed for information on level of education, em-
ployment by Congress, employment by the President, em-
ployment in private business, employment by an academic
institution, whether the person came up through the ranks in
the agency, the person’s length of service as a bureau chief,
and whether or not the person was listed in Who’s Who. These
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eight indicators create a factor measure that reflects three
major career patterns-the civil servant who joins the organi-
zation early and remains there for an entire career, the pro-
fessional who develops expertise outside government and
enters the agency near the top, and the politician who is
appointed to the position as a political reward.9
Cohesion. The indicators of cohesion focus on the bureau-
crat’s contentement with the organization as demonstrated
by the most visible indicator of that contentment, turnover.
For regular employees, indicators of cohesion were the volun-
tary separation rate and the average percentage of agency
positions left vacation every month for 1974-1976. Two similar
indicators were created for agency leaders, one for turnover
and one for vacancies. One more direct indicator of vital
performance is the percentage of the agency’s supergrade
employees who are listed in Who’s Who in Government. This
recognition should be positively correlated with perceptions
of performance outside the agency. The five indicators of
cohesion were combined to create a single measure of co-
hesion. 10
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Francis Rourke’s (1976) theory contends that agency power
is the function of clientele support, agency expertise, agency
leadership, and organizational cohesion. This statement
can be represented by the diagram in Figure 1 where each
independent variable is causally linked to agency power. As
we are unconcerned about the relationships between the in-
dependent variables, these relationships are unanalyzed in
the model and depicted in the figure by curved lines.
The model generally conforms to the assumptions of path
analysis (Land, 1969; Asher, 1976). The relationships are
linear, the causal sequence is specified, the measures are
interval, and an examination of the data does not reveal
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correlated errors or heteroscedasticity. Using the techniques
of path analysis, two sets of parameters can be estimated.
First, the direct impact of each independent variable on
bureau power can be estimated; the direct impact of a variable
is the impact that that variable alone has on the dependent
variable when all other independent variables are held con-
stant. The second set of parameters to be estimated is the
total impact of each independent variable. Total impact is
both the direct impact of the variable plus the indirect impact
the variable has on the dependent variable through the other
independent variables.
Table I presents the regression estimates of the two sets of
parameters for the model in Figure 1. The predictive ability of
the model is good (R = .6) with all independent variables show-
ing a positive but moderate impact on bureau power. The
estimates of direct and total impact are similar in magnitude.
This results because the independent variables are only weakly
correlated. Clientele support and cohesion show the strongest
direct impacts on agency power. The total impact on clientele
support is greater, but some of this impact is indirect through
expertise. Cohesion’s impact is almost entirely direct and un-
affected by the other variables. Expertise has the third-greatest
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Figure 1: Path Analysis of Rourke’s Theory of Bureau Power
direct impact, with some indirect impact through clientele
support. Although leadership appears to be the weakest in-
fluence, it still has a significant direct impact (and some
indirect impact through cohesion).
Examining the relationships between the independent vari-
ables and the two components of agency power (resources
and autonomy) reveals some interesting findings.&dquo; Clientele
support and expertise have a major impact on agency au-
tonomy with almost no impact on resource extraction. This
finding is not unexpected, as political support and techno-
logical superiority are two of the primary reasons Congress
grants autonomy to an agency. Leadership and cohesion, on
the other hand, have a major impact on resource extraction
but do not affect an agency’s autonomy.
The findings suggest a slight modification of Rourke’s
theory of bureaucratic power. Although clientele, expertise,
cohesion, and leadership all lead to enhanced bureau power,
they do so through different paths. An agency with ample
resources that desires greater autonomy should attempt to
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
371Meier / MEASURING ORGANIZATIONAL POWER
Agencies that have autonomy but lack resources require
leadership and cohesive personnel. Attempts to increase re-
sources by building clientele or developing expertise will
probably not succeed. Increasing autonomy without clientele
support or expertise may also be futile.
DISCUSSION
Despite the moderate-to-weak internal validity of the
agency power measures, the measures appear to have good
external validity. Not only is agency power correlated with
clientele support, expertise, leadership, and cohesion, but
all the relationships are positive, as Rourke’s theory predicts.
Clearly the results are strong enough to suggest that future
research along similar lines will be fruitful. The most obvious
focus for scholarly activity is on the measures themselves, in
order to refine them and provide new tests for internal validity.
A second promising avenue of research is the application
of these findings to the literature on controlling bureaucracy
in a society. Although this subject is beyond the scope of this
paper, some of the more obvious points should be mentioned.
The autonomy of government agencies is a result of strong
clientele support and agency expertise. These causes cannot
be limited by either Congress or the President, the citizenry’s
main tools for controlling bureaucracy. Because agencies
administer programs and dispense benefits, they can attract
clientele support regardless of congressional or presidential
action-witness the successful attempt of the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to resist President
Carter’s 1977 cutback in water projects, which the agencies
accomplished by mobilizing their clientele. Expertise is also
difficult to counter. Even with Congress’ attempt to develop
in-house expertise through the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, the Congressional Budget Office, and others, Congress
must still rely on agency information for most of its decisions.
Resources, being a function of leadership and cohesion,
are more subject to presidential and congressional control.
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Both institutions can affect the leadership of an agency as
they participate in the selection process. Unfortunately for
this factor, however, the resource controls of Congress and
the President have been severely weakened by uncontrollable
spending. Uncontrollable spending (Social Security is a good
example) represents a government commitment to spend
money in the future that is limited only by the number of
people who qualify. Without passing new laws, spending in
these areas cannot be controlled. Estimates of the portion
of the federal government’s budget that is uncontrolled run
as high as 75%. Even with the ability to control leadership
selection, Congress and the President may not be able to
restrict agency resources. In combination, these findings
paint a pessimistic picture for anyone seeking to control
bureaucracy.
A third promising area of research is the empirical specifica-
tion of Rourke’s theory. Regulatory agencies, for example, are
perceived as weak agencies. Given an adequate data set, this
approach can determine if regulatory agencies are indeed weak
and, if so, why. Similar research needs to be done on defense
and foreign policy agencies, distributive agencies, and redis-
tributive agencies.
SUMMARY
This research was an attempt to measure organizational
power for 127 federal government agencies. After separating
power into its two components, resources and autonomy,
measures of each component were derived by constructing
indexes from several indicators. The measures proved to have
low to moderate internal validity but good external validity.
The measure of agency power was used in an empirical
evaluation of Francis Rourke’s theory of agency power, where
power is a function of leadership, clientele, cohesion, and
expertise. The measurement of power in this research was then
related to promising future areas of research.
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NOTES
1. Although organizations technically cannot act (only people can), treating
organizations as actors often permits one to analyze certain questions. This is useful
because the people occupying positions of leadership in an organization often change,
yet the organization continues. Our generalizations about organizations can be
interpreted as the actions of individuals occupying leadership positions who are acting
in the name of the organization.
2. The first factor of the factor analysis solution accounted for 29% of the
variance in the 6 resources indicators. Only one factor was extracted because there is
no theoretical reason that the concept resources should be multidimensional.
Although 29% of the variance is not unusually large, the percentage is acceptable
because the individual indicators were not highly correlated. In fact, the low
percentage of variance suggests that each indicator has only a slight covariation with
the underlying concept and a great deal of "error." This fact suggests that the validity of
these measures should be examined closely, despite the logical connections between
the indicators and the underlying concept.
3. The first factor accounts for 24% of the variance in the autonomy indicators.
Agencies range along a dimension from legislative autonomy on one end of the scale to
program autonomy on the other . See the preceding note.
4. A caveat about this measure is in order. The measure represents a relative
pecking order of generalized organizational power. The resources and autonomy
measure represent the degree of dependence on the political environment. Without
further research we cannot be sure that this generalized measure can be translated into
the distribution of societal values or the creation of dependence relationships with
others.
5. For most agencies the NORC national priorities question that is part of the
General Social Survey was used. For few policy areas that were not covered by this
survey, data from other national surveys were used.
6. The intensity scores were based on the assumption that testimony for the
bureau specifically was more of a commitment than testimony on a particular
program. Testimony for a bureau was worth 3 points (or -3 points if the testimony was
negative) and testimony for a program was worth 2 points (or -2). Each group
testifying for a bureau was then given a score ranging from +5 to -5. The variable used
here for group intensity is the mean intensity score for all groups testifying on the
bureau.
7. The first factor extracted from the analysis accounts for only 14% of the
variance of the indicators. The factor is readily interpretable, ranging from strong
diffuse support on one end of the scale to strong clientele support on the other end of
the scale. Although empirically there appear to be two dimensions here, diffuse
support is a weak explanatory variable, and its inclusion as a separate factor would not
affect the results of the model presented in the next section.
8. The first factor explained 18% of the variance in the 6 indicators. The factor
ranges from bureaus that are large and technologically advanced on one end to highly
professionalized bureaus on the other.
9. The first leadership factor explained only 14% of the variance. The low
percentage of variance is a result of the three separate and distinct career patterns with
little overlap and, thus, little covariation.
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10. The first factor accounted for 24% of the variance in the five indicators of
cohesion. The variable appears to be unidimensional.
11. The conclusions presented are also based on regressions of the four variables
on both resources and autonomy. The results of these regressions are not shown here in
order to conserve space. They may be obtained directly from the author.
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